

MASRWG Conference 2021

Defence MASS Technology Update

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Introduction

- Royal Navy **Nemesis**,
- Autonomy & Lethality
 - DARE - Rapid acquisition
 - NavyX - Experimentation



Conduct curation, discovery, incubation, integration and experimentation activity to deliver spirally developed Minimum Viable Capability



SPECAP


Curation Discovery Incubation Integration Experimentation

Autonomy Enabled, Data Centric & Digitally Driven

Autonomy Enabled



Data Centric



Digitally Driven




Introduction

- Autonomous Pacific 24 seaboat (aP24)
- Integrated into the Combat Management System of a Type 23 Frigate
- Investigate delivery of Force Protection and ISR missions
- Focus of this presentation is:
 - Security accreditation process
 - Safety approval process



The Approval & Certification Process




Security Assurance

- Example security requirements:
 - Def Stan 05-138 - Cyber Security for Defence Suppliers
 - DEFCON 658 - Cyber
 - DEFCON 659A - Security Measures
 - DEFCON 660 - Reportable Official and Official-Sensitive Security Requirements
- Underpinned by contract specific (JSPs) e.g.
 - Risk Management
 - Defence Crypto-security Operating Instructions




Security Assurance



- Security is managed through the DART process
 - Allocates a MoD Security Accreditor
 - Facilitated by a series of Security Working Groups
- Key deliverables
 - RMADS - Risk Management and Accreditation Document Set
 - SyOPS - Security Operating Procedures
 - CoCo - Code of Connection
- Underpinned by rigorous, independent penetration testing

Multi-level security architecture & ITHC / Penetration Testing



Safety Approach

- Much of the donor vessel design remains unchanged by the unmanned conversion
 - the approach builds on the foundations of the existing Safety Cases and Hazard Logs
 - and from extensive experience of the in-service P24 Mk4
- The USV Safety Case is strengthened by additional activities in accordance with:
 - DSA02-DMR
 - Def-Stan 00-056
 - MASS UK Industry Conduct Principles and Code of Practice
- using well established Hazard Identified & Analysis processes
- Key deliverables are:
 - SECR – Safety & Environmental Case Report
 - SOP – Safe Operating Procedures (incl. RAs)
 - SECD – Security & Environmental Control Document
 - NAG MoD Boat Safety Certificate
 - CCU – Certificate of Clearance for Use



Safety Approach

- The **Safety Argument** uses the concept of equivalency and claims that the aPAC24 is **as safe as manned**.
- This claim is developed using a Goal Structured Notation (GSN) supported by evidence
- The Top Goal of the GSN argument is stated as “The PAC24 USV System is acceptably safe to use”, which is met through a number of sub-goals and strategies.

Safety Approach

- A “Strength in Depth” approach has been used to provide multiple layers of protection
 - range from SIL certified systems to *man-in-the-loop* procedural controls.
 - sufficiently mitigate any residual operating risk in the context of trials and experimentation.
 - Further low level controls for specific hazards
- Layer 1
System Integrity Prior knowledge and gradual system testing that provide a level of confidence in system integrity
- Layer 2
System Oversight Provision of alternative / additional situational awareness
- Layer 3
Limitations Operating procedures and limitations
- Layer 4
Fall-back To alter or halt activities, or react to issues

Summary

- The issues of safety and security are significant and interlinked
- MoD and industry have robust established processes of assurance
- Layered controls effective in controlled trials scenarios
- Higher levels of system integrity required in real operational scenarios



Thank you

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